Daria Dugina (Darya Dugina), daughter of Alexander Dugin, was reported to have died on August 20, 2022 in a car bombing in the Moscow suburbs. Russian political authorities, federal police, and propagandists have consistently portrayed it as an act of Ukrainian terrorism and pointed to Ukrainian suspects.
Conversely, Ukraine has officially denied these allegations. Rather than taking the event at face value as it has been portrayed in Russian media, many Western reports have questioned whether it was an act of “false flag” terrorism.
In this scenario, the killing of Dugina would be intended to bolster public support for the war in Ukraine by reinforcing the idea of Ukraine as a fascist, terrorist state. It would be analogous to a widespread theory that the FSB had carried out a series of apartment bombings in September 1999 in order to bolster public support for a second war in Chechnya.
When Alexander Dugin first released a public statement about the assassination, he did so through Konstantin Malofeev on Malofeev’s Telegram channel [1]. Malofeev, like Dugin has not only been sanctioned for his actions related to Ukraine, but is a member of the ultra-conservative Izborsky Club; a philosophical group which was co-founded by Alexander Prokhanov and Vitali Averyanov, and includes many prominent Russians, some close to Putin [2].
This long-read report demonstrates that regardless of whom may be responsible for the crime, the death of Daria Dugina has been consciously manipulated by figures like Alexander Dugin, Alexander Prokhanov, and Konstantin Malofeev in order to frame the murder as a kind of symbol of martyrdom which supports the neo-imperialist “Ideology of Victory” that was formally articulated by the Izborskists in October 2021, prior to the Ukraine invasion.
This observation in and of itself does not mean the Izborskists have complicity in the murder. But it does seek to prove objectively that the death has been used consciously from the start as an ideological and political instrument of Russian imperial power.
The Death of Daria Dugina and Speculation to Date
The apparent death of Russian Daria Dugina (29) in a car bombing on the outskirts of Moscow on August 20, 2022 caused a flurry of domestic and international media speculation. The explosion had killed the daughter of Alexander Dugin, one of the most notorious ideologists of the “Russian world”, a philosopher known among other things for his genocidal statements about Ukraine.
Initial rumors suggested that Dugin himself was the target of the assassin(s), but that he had miraculously taken another vehicle at the last moment, as he and his daughter departed a right-wing folk festival called “Tradition”. In leaving the festival, Daria Dugina had taken her father’s car, so it would have been easy to mistake her for Alexander Dugin.
In the midst of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it seemed parsimonious at first glance that whoever carried out this murder was likely sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause and/or hostile to the Russian nationalist cause.
Denis Pushilin, a leader in the Donetsk republic claimed without evidence that Ukrainian terrorists were responsible. On August 21, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova echoed Pushilin and claimed that if Ukrainians were responsible, it would have to be examined as “state terrorism”. [3]
On August 22, the FSB had “solved” this murder, naming Natalia Vovk as the prime suspect. They alleged Vovk, along with her 12-year-old daughter had been staying in the same apartment building as Dugina as a way to observe Dugina’s patterns and routines; suggesting that Daria Dugina was in fact the prime target. They alleged that Vovk also attended the festival, and fled shortly after to Estonia [1].
Evidence was produced by the FSB which seemed to show Vovk in a photo ID for the Ukrainian Azov Battalion (an all-male regiment).
Online analysts claimed that the image depicting Vovk as an Azov soldier was photoshopped, and it was disputed by the Ukrainian military as a forgery [4].
As counterintuitive as it may have initially appeared, many analysts quickly became skeptical of the idea of the attack as the work of Ukrainian partisans. A spokesman for President Zelensky officially denied involvement, saying that: “We are not a criminal state, unlike Russia, and definitely not a terrorist state.”
There was also skepticism over the speed at which this crime had been solved. After all, this was a criminal justice system chronically unable to solve the internationally publicized high-profile murders and attempted murders of numerous dissident journalists and politicians within the country for many years. The sudden solution suggested a manufactured outcome to some [5].
And of course, Kremlinologists were well aware and generally confident in the idea that the FSB had orchestrated a series of apartment bombings across Moscow in 1999 as a “false flag” pretext for elevating Putin’s status as the strong man leader of the country, as well as to serve as justification for a second war in Chechnya. From the first hours after the bombing, many researchers began to question whether this death of Dugina also served a similar purpose related to catalyzing public support for the new war of aggression in Ukraine [6].
It was even speculated by at least one researcher that the National Republican Army (NRA), a never-before-heard-of dissident group which claimed responsibility for the bombing might itself be an FSB construct intended to identify and eliminate sympathetic citizens ready to counter the Russian government [7].
There was also a suggestion that Natalia Vovk herself may have actually been a Russian agent, and earlier photos were produced of a woman who looked similar to Vovk in the company of a Donetsk provocateur – allegedly her husband – who had been one of the organizers of a referendum to leave Ukraine in 2014 [8].
At this time, it seems clear that in the context of the Ukraine War, Russia will maintain it has solved the crime and that Ukraine is responsible. In the West and in Ukraine by contrast, it seems likely that speculation will continue to grow that the FSB or another agency (such as GRU) was responsible for the killing as a “false flag”, and it is unlikely that any hard evidence is ever going to be made available.
Summarizing the Izborsky Ideology of Victory [9]
In October 2021, the Izborsky Club published an ‘integral report’ entitled: “The ideology of Victory as a national project”. The author was listed as Izborsky Club co-founder Vitali Averyanov, but the text credits it to “more than 50 works of scientists and writers, members of the Izborsk community”.
As opposed to what it characterizes as a “divide and conquer” strategy which has dominated the past 30 years of Russian politics; the report advocates for a unifying “ideology and image of the future” which is “a consolidating, integrating, and not splitting society system of worldview.”
The report claims it is “not about another ideological utopia, but about a kind of “eternal ideology””. Indeed, as opposed to a utopia, the ideology advocates for a “dynamic conservatism”, as well as concepts like a new “oprichnina” to drive innovation as part of a “dictatorship of culture”.
The “historical function of Russia’s new leading ideology of the 21st century… is to become the semantic structure of a new generation of organizational weapons” which the writer calls “key to the survival of the country”. Overall, it seems this esoteric ideological strategy is intended to make Russia more resilient to an alleged “global hybrid war”. But it is believed it would make the country more innovative.
The treatise develops a system of “infonomics” to oppose capitalism and fight a “hidden war primarily in the field of redistribution of finances, the seizure of property, control systems, soft, viscous-quick aggression through the media and cultural consciousness.” This war “is won not by traditional military forces, but by means of organizational weapons”.
The ideology (not unlike the Soviet system as the report observes) also seeks to organize society around socialist meritocratic and solidarity lines to create a new elite class to manage this cultural offense. This new elite class, trained on the ideology of victory would theoretically be implemented to manage the system at home, as well as “to develop their own plan of attack, prepare and implement it” in order for the “destruction of such a system of the enemy”.
The text also makes repeated references to concepts like “spiritual warfare”, “mystical victory”, an “invisible battle” and the idea that “Holy Russia lies not in the field of “geography”, but in the field of “metaphysics””. Russian Victory “is a light that has arisen in pitch darkness.”
The “most important… images and concepts” of the new ideology are “the New Flood and the transnational anti-system approaching it, and on the other hand, the New Ark, which Russia is called to become.” Averyanov writes that “building of the Ark country” is “our main goal, the Victory of the new generation we long for.” This “Russian Ark” is stated to be a way to resist Western values such as economic competition and freedom-independence, which it sees as leading to cultural disintegration and loss of sovereignty.
The ideology also claims to draw on ideas like Alexander Dugin’s “National Bolshevism”, “a combination of socialism and Orthodoxy”, “the ideas of Russian cosmism”, “The Third Rome”, Catechon (“Restrainer”), “the Holy Alliance of Alexander I”, “the Yalta world order of Stalin”, however, again the highest embodiment of a “sacred symbol of Russia as the new Noah’s Ark”.
The “sacred triad of Russian ideology” as articulated by Alexander Prokhanov in relation to this doctrine is “One People – One Destiny – One Victory.”
The treatise claims “tomorrow will be even worse than today, the world will become more and more explosive, prone to the waves of the “New Flood” – multifaceted, but primarily associated with the collapse of the fundamental foundations of the world order”. The “Ark Civilization” anticipates “the collapse of the globalist project, the disintegration of the golem society it is building, as a key landmark event.”
It is distinctly pro-traditionalist in tone; anti-LGBTQ, anti-green energy, anti-abortion, pro-large family etc.. Of course, Jewish philanthropist George Soros is a key player in this “anti-human propaganda of the Flood Civilization.”
The report portrays a picture of financial conspiracism similar to the brand of Russian Orthodox nationalist ideas validated by the fin de siècle Russian secret police forgery, The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion. It discusses a “Great Zeroing” at length. It claims that “the world financial oligarchy, the largest banking families, global corporations (first of all, big pharma, big digital)” are a “new priesthood” or “new clergy, with [a] false messianic worldview” that is based on “anti-Christian spirituality of the gnostic type”; and the new priesthood aims “to turn people into tightly controlled passive consumers of induced dreams, whose every move is prompted by Artificial Intelligence.”
Accordingly, this manifesto draws heavily and consciously on apocalyptic themes and historical concepts of Russian messianism to ideologically nurture what is referred to as a “Fifth Empire” of Russian history and what is apparently open advocacy for a “New Middle Ages”. Despite this conflict between medieval ideas of apocalypse and a future-outlook, it acknowledges the Berdyaev-like idea that “Russians are tuned to the end of things, they see the development of the human race in the light of eschatology.”
Despite a discourse which is at times highly skeptical of technology (and, in its concern about the data collection activities of transnational corporations seems to parallel apocalyptic Russian Orthodox nationalist concerns about technologies like bar codes and computers), the manifesto insists the ideology is not intended to “act as digital Luddites of the 21st century”.
It is predicted that “information innovations and “artificial intelligence” in the Ark Civilization…will make the state cheap, invisible and at the same time harmonious, will save management from mistakes that bring disharmony to public life.”
To this end of building an informational Ark civilization with these features, the report calls for the development of homegrown Russian information technology and capabilities, and even the “creation of a technical alternative to the current Internet”.
It suggests that Russia establish sovereignty over its existing social networks and “start systematically using them as a management tool, and gradually, without delay, build our own civilizational IT-architecture”. It is argued that “at the decisive stage of the transition to a new ideology, [Russia] may have to go to war with global social platforms”, and “Russia will have to both block Internet giants that do not comply with our laws, and itself carry out a partial exit from the global network.”
The report argues that if these steps to establish social media sovereignty are “not done now, transnational giants in a relatively short time can really surpass the state-civilization in their real resource power, and therefore block the possibility of a breakthrough for them to Great Development, an alternative to the “digital flood”.”
It predicts that the field of “synthetic infonomics”, which blends “management systems, and the main institutions of society, and its economy in the culture-centric direction” replacing “hierarchical goals in information flow management with cooperative, symbiotic goals… will quickly become a factor of international, geostrategic influence” which competes with capitalism and the “transnational netocracy”.
The report claims that in practice, infonomics will allow the state “to create ultra-cheap financial capital” and “will make it possible to achieve record growth rates and reverse the situation with the still steady decline in Russia’s share in the world economy”. (The report claims that “capitalism is inherently incompatible with infonomics, so it desperately needs to prevent its advent, for which it is rapidly introducing mind control and total control technologies”.)
According to the report, much of this transformation to an innovative society can be helped by creating a new “oprichnina” in the cultural and economic sphere. Its meaning would not be primarily repressive, but “at the same time, an aggravation of the political struggle cannot be ruled out, because the change of ways never proceeds painlessly.”
Also in relation to technology, despite being openly against transhumanism, the ideology is also “ultimately striving for immortality according to the precepts of Christ and the precepts of Russian cosmism.” “Without being distracted by the tricks of transhumanists, we will lead a real fight against the aging and decrepitude of a person, prolonging his active, creative phase of life…according to the precepts of Russian cosmists, we will direct the development of civilization towards the discovery of superpowers and the improvement of existing abilities and talents (multifaceted “human construction”).”
The “delicate sprout” of this ideology is not-accidentally “based, almost entirely, on the category of the Great Victory of 1945”, which is referred to as an “idea of Holy Victory” and the report notes “our Patriotic War is always sacred”.
The treatise argues that the common theme of the “essence of the Russian Dream” is a “legacy of victories”. It seeks to characterize already ongoing Russian “geostrategic projects” in the Arctic, Russian Far East, Mediterranean (Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, and Syria), and Russian 2020 constitutional reforms as evidence of the revealing of “the nascent ideology of the Fifth Empire”.
It also seeks to portray the Russian Fifth Empire as the “heir” to “mythical Hyperborea and Scythia”, “the family of Japeth”,“Eastern Slavs”, “Orthodox Byzantium”, and Eurasianism (“called the legacy of the tolerant statehood of Genghis Khan”). It also claims to “inherit the cultures and values of Muslims, Buddhists, pagans, representatives of other faiths and cultures who have taken root in the trunk of the Russian statehood.”
Averyanov’s manifesto asserts this “ideology of victory” is the ideology of modern Russia, but that it is in an “embryonic state”, and requires development as a national project to be successful. Early in the treatise, he advocates: “we have to win a new Victory, the successor Victory, in the near future”.
The Ideology of Victory Since the Start of the Special Military Operation
The Izborskists have continued to market this manifesto and idea since October 2021 and up to the present period during the so-called Special Military Operation and especially around the time of Daria Dugina’s demise.
On May 19, Prokhanov published an article “From “special operation” to “people’s war”” on Zavtra. This text emphasizes the dream-nature of this war which the ideology consistently addresses, this time within the context of Ukraine. A war which is suggested to be fought with cultural codes and symbols, and instrumental in building a new Russia.
“On the Ukrainian battlefields, the Ukrainian fascist codes and the codes of the Russian Victory are fighting to the death. This war is not covered in military reports. But the outcome of this war is being watched by mystics, historiosophists, psychics, priests, because the clash of these codes determines the course of a special military operation. These codes, like combat units, need constant nourishment, constant replenishment, and with every month of the war, the Russian consciousness becomes more and more a defensive consciousness, a victorious consciousness.”…
“And in the conditions of hostilities we have to build a new economy, industry, find new forms of management, create a new elite, scooping it from the battlefield and defense factories. We are creating the economy of the Russian Victory, the industry of the Russian Victory, the elite of the Russian Victory, the art of the Russian Victory. And such a victorious country is led by the leader of the Russian Victory.” [10]
On August 18, 2022, a similar text to the overall manifesto entitled “Victory Wins” was published on Zavtra. It is a chapter excerpt from the new book “Our Tomorrow” (2022), and was posted in anticipation of the 10th anniversary of the Izborsky Club on September 8, 2022. The introduction emphasized the “one People, one Destiny, one Victory” concept and exhorts unity to “help the members of the Izborsk Club to overcome the darkness.” [11]
On August 20, 2022, the day which Dugina would die – Prokhanov gave an interview to Malofeev’s Tsargrad on the ideology of victory and the Russian Dream which its editors titled “Alexander Prokhanov : Special Military Operation can give rise to a new ideology of victory”.
Prokhanov in this article particularly seems to forecast the Special Military Operation as a natural extension of Russia’s thousand-year-history. This history is synthetic of “paganism, Christianity, the Romanov Empire, Bolshevism, etc.” as well as the current Russia post-1991, leading to this new imperial Russia and an “ideal state”. This new empire would be underpinned with “Russian dream codes”. “It is important that this state will have the ideology of the Russian Dream. And that means the ideology of the Russian victory.”
As a notable aside in the context of death and propaganda, Prokhanov in this interview remarked cynically on Mikhail Gorbachev’s longevity, casting him as an anti-Christian enemy of Russia, and saying “He outlived his time, his comrades-in-arms, and will outlive all of us – there is a feeling that he is eternal, the same “eternal Jew” who was given immortality, that he will look at writhing humanity and he himself will suffer and writhe. Gorbachev, with this seal on his forehead, continues to exist, and he is not a threat to all of us, but a kind of terrible reminder that we live in a time of domination by satanic forces.” [12]
Utilizing the Death of Daria Dugina as an Ideological Tool
On August 22, the same day the case was “solved”, Konstantin Malofeev posted a text on his Telegram channel announcing a memorial service for Daria Dugina on August 23. He said it had been written by Alexander Dugin and that Dugin had asked him to publish it.
Dugin claimed his daughter had been killed “as a result of a terrorist attack carried out by the Nazi Ukrainian regime”. Speaking to a collective Russia, he said “our hearts yearn for more than just revenge or retribution. It’s too small, not Russian. We only need our Victory [capitalization of Victory (Победа) is in the text]. My daughter laid her maiden life on her altar. So, win, please! … Let it inspire the sons of our Fatherland to the feat even now.” [1]
At Dugina’s funeral service on August 23, Dugin repeatedly emphasized his daughter’s “Orthodox” character, as well as that her first words learned as a child included “Russia”, “our state”, “our people”, and “our empire”.
Dugin portrayed a final conversation with his daughter where he claimed she wanted “to be on the side of the forces of light” and that “history is a battle of light and darkness. God and his adversary. And that today’s war is also part of the war of light and darkness.”
Dugin claimed his daughter would have had one desire: “Do not glorify me, fight for our great country, defend our faith, holy Orthodoxy, love our Russian people.” He added “she died for Russia at the front, and this front is here.” [13]
Malofeev (who employed both Alexander Dugin and Daria Dugina at Tsargrad TV) also spoke at the 2 hour long funeral emphasizing Dugina’s status as a new kind of Russian Orthodox martyr who portended Russian victory.
Malofeev said “Dasha was a warrior. And she didn’t die in vain.” He said “the people who are at war with us… They don’t understand that the Russian people are not only made up of those who live now. But also, from those who lived before us. And those who will live after. And with the blood of our martyrs, we grow stronger. The New Martyrs of Russia in the 1920s became such martyrs for us. Thanks to the sacrificial feat for Christ which modern Russia lives. He lives – and wins … And thanks to this untimely death of our dear and beloved Dasha, we will definitely win this war too.”
Other speakers emphasized the concept of victory in a way which also called attention to themes of Nazism. Despite most speakers casting the supposed Ukrainian perpetrators as satanic fascists, Leonid Slutsky of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia said that “we must be united like never before in our recent history” and used the slogan “One country – and its future. One President! And one victory!”
Observers immediately noted this evoked the Nazi slogan “One people, one Reich, one Fuhrer”. (Strangely, the similarity to Prokhanov’s formulation of “one People, one Destiny, one Victory” was not noted.)
State Duma deputy Yelena Panina also emphasized the need to unite the Russian people in victory utilizing these themes. She said “we are faced with such inhuman, such satanic evil that only by uniting we can cope. We need a victory not only in Ukraine. There can be no question at all that some part, some piece of it remains, because again this Nazi nest will flourish there. There must be a complete victory … But there must also be a victory in our souls, our hearts. And the understanding that this is evil that opposes us, we must win only together...” [14]
Conclusion
It seems apparent that the death of Daria Dugina has been utilized opportunistically by the Izborsky Club figures Alexander Dugin and Konstantin Malofeev as a symbol which reinforces the Izborsky Club’s “Ideology of Victory” which has been articulated since at least October 2021.
It is worth noting the emphasis on the Great Patriotic War in the Ideology of Victory, and the consistent use of anti-Nazi rhetoric in the war against Ukraine. A Russian Ideology of Victory may also emphasize anti-Semitic symbols as well, and in part at least seems to regurgitate yet a new version of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion; replacing Jews with technology executives (but don’t forget George Soros).
The funeral itself was commented on by mainstream Russian press for its unusual emphasis on “unity” [14]. This also seems closely aligned to the stated goal of creating an “Ideology of Victory” which would unite Russia, as opposed to the “divide and conquer” techniques which the manifesto posits characterized post-1991 Russian politics.
In her analysis of the Izborsky Club [2], Marlene Laruelle noted the emphasis of Izborsky Club philosophy on Red-White reconciliation. This also seems to be an explicit goal of the Ideology of Victory, and could perhaps be noted in this instance of provoking national unity.
Dugina’s death was framed by her father and Malofeev within the context of martyrdom and symbols of Russia such as Orthodoxy which are linked to the Ideology of Victory.
Dugin’s message posted on Malofeev’s channel openly exhorted for using Daria Dugina’s death as a motivation for “victory” and to “win please” in the Special Military Operation. Dugin also discussed concepts of spiritual warfare, like a battle of light versus darkness and good versus evil, which his daughter had been fighting in. Many other speakers at the funeral discussed concepts present within the October 2021 ideology.
As the ideology is fundamentally about creating new “organizational weapons” for functional hybrid warfare activities at the state level, perhaps the performance around Dugina’s death can also be framed as an instrument of Russian hybrid warfare; if someone were to put the ideology into best practice as seems appropriate – and Izborskists would be in a good position to. Perhaps they intend to use the death as a recruitment tool for this “new elite” of Russian power in the infonomics society they visualize.
In researching this matter, I also noted great variance in press sources, some calling Dugin one of the primary ideologists of the Russian World, and others significantly downplaying his role. What I did note subjectively was that RT as state media reporting on the assassination distinctly played Dugin down as far as having any official role or connection to Putin. Here, we saw at the funeral that a letter written by Putin and read there specifically noted that Dugin had no role in politics, which Kommersant noted as somewhat of an insult to a grieving father. It seems evidence that Putin wants to downplay the connection himself for whatever reason.
Certainly, if the FSB or another Russian agency has orchestrated the crime, the case gets more interesting too, as far as the difficulty in disavowing Dugin’s influence on the Kremlin ideology. It might also raise questions about how good of a father Dugin was.
For my $0.02 I currently speculate that the attack was likely carried out by Russian secret services or nationalist fanatics. The whole media speculation around the event – which at surface value suggested that Ukrainians were acting like terrorists – seems to have been evidence of a “reflexive control” strategy in propaganda intended to build support for Russia’s war both domestically and internationally.
Perhaps the immortalization of Dugina is a natural step on the route to the “Russian Ark” the Izborskists dream of. As Russia is increasingly shut off from the world as a result of its military misadventure, they hope the nation will formalize its own long-standing delusional messianic dream.
The Fifth Empire’s ideological plotline appears to be a new kind of information security society based loosely on George Orwell’s Animal Farm, Russian messianism, and Kim Il Sung’s North Korea. In that sense, this report isn’t really that surprising if you’ve been following this stuff.
References:
[1] “«Малофеев опубликовал первое после гибели дочери заявление Дугина»” (“Malofeev published the first statement of Dugin after the death of his daughter”), Izvestia, August 22 2022, https://iz.ru/1383373/2022-08-22/malofeev-opublikoval-pervoe-posle-gibeli-docheri-zaiavlenie-dugina (original Telegram post: https://t.me/kvmalofeev/921 )
[2] Marlene Laruelle, 2016, “The Izborsky Club, or the New Conservative Avant-Garde in Russia”, The Russian Review, 75 (October 2016): 626–44
[3] “«Захарова прокомментировала убийство Дарьи Дугиной в Подмосковье»” (“Zakharova commented on the murder of Daria Dugina in the suburbs”), RT Russia, August 21 2022, https://russian.rt.com/russia/news/1039645-zaharova-ubiistvo-darya-dugina
[4] Elizabeth Rushton, “Ist Dugina doch nicht tot? Im Internet kursieren bizarre Theorien zum Anschlag” (“Isn’t Dugina dead after all? Bizarre theories about the attack are circulating on the Internet”), Berliner Zeitung, August 26 2022, https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/politik-gesellschaft/ist-dugina-doch-nicht-tot-im-internet-kursieren-bizarre-theorien-zum-anschlag-li.259509
[5] Sinéad Baker, “Russia critics question FSB’s 2-day investigation into Putin ally’s death, saying murders of dissidents 15 years ago are still unresolved”, Business Insider, August 23 2022, https://www.businessinsider.com/darya-dugina-death-russia-critics-question-2-day-fsb-investigation-2022-8
[6] “Moscow Blames Ukraine in Death of Daria Dugina”, The New York Times, August 22 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/08/22/world/ukraine-russia-war-news
[7] “«Российские “партизаны” заявили о ликвидации дочери Дугина: что известно об организации»” (“Russian “partisans” announced the liquidation of Dugin’s daughter: what is known about the organization”), Apostrophe, August 21 2022, https://apostrophe.ua/news/world/ex-ussr/2022-08-21/rossiyskie-partizanyi-zayavili-o-likvidatsii-docheri-dugina-chto-izvestno-ob-organizatsii/277348
[8] Victor Davidoff, “Who Killed Daria Dugina? Untruths and Consequences: The Russian blame machine is spinning versions that don’t bear scrutiny”, The Moscow Times, August 23 2022, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/08/23/who-killed-daria-dugina-untruths-and-consequences-a78636
[9] Vitali Averyanov, “«Идеология Победы как национальный проект (интегральный доклад Изборского клуба)»” (“The ideology of Victory as a national project (an integral report of the Izborsk club)”), Izborsky Club, October 24, 2021, https://izborsk-club.ru/21816
[10] Alexander Prokhanov, “«От «спецоперации» к «войне народной»»” (“From “special operation” to “people’s war””), Zavtra, May 19 2022, https://zavtra.ru/blogs/ot_spetcoperatcii_k_vojne_narodnoj
[11] Our Tomorrow, “«Победа побед из книги “Изборская идеология”»” (““victory wins” from the book “Izborsk ideology””), Zavtra, August 18 2022, https://zavtra.ru/blogs/pobeda_pobed
[12] Alexander Prokhanov, “«АЛЕКСАНДР ПРОХАНОВ: СВО МОЖЕТ ПОРОДИТЬ НОВУЮ ИДЕОЛОГИЮ ПОБЕДЫ»” (“ALEXANDER PROKHANOV: SVO CAN GIVE RISE TO A NEW IDEOLOGY OF VICTORY”), Tsargrad, August 20 2022, https://tsargrad.tv/articles/aleksandr-prohanov-svo-mozhet-porodit-novuju-ideologiju-pobedy_608505
[13] Vitaly Kolbasin, “«Что сказал Дугин в своей речи на похоронах дочери Дарьи. Тезисы»” (“What Dugin said in his speech at the funeral of his daughter Daria. Abstracts”), Arguments and Facts, August 23 2022, https://aif.ru/society/people/chto_skazal_dugin_v_svoey_rechi_na_pohoronah_docheri_dari_tezisy
[14] “««С кровью наших мучеников мы становимся сильнее»
В Москве простились с Дарьей Дугиной»”(“With the blood of our martyrs, we grow stronger” In Moscow, said goodbye to Daria Dugina”), Kommersant, August 23 2022, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5525419